You Lose, We Win

NUMBER 13-08-00267-CV
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
In its sole issue on appeal, the City attacks the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law, arguing that, as a matter of law, the City Charter does not bar City Council members from participating in the City’s health insurance plan on the same basis as the City’s full-time employees. More specifically, the City contends that: (1) chapter 172 of the local government code authorizes political subdivisions to provide health insurance to city officials on the same basis as regular employees, see TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 172.002(6), 172.004(a) (Vernon 2008); (2) the City Charter does not set a maximum limit on compensation; (3) the City Charter only applies to monetary compensation; and (4) the City “has consistently construed the charter to allow insurance for council members on the same basis as City employees.”

The Merovingian so stipulates as to item (1); TEX. LOC GOV'T CODE does allow political subdivisions to offer such insurance to city officials.

However, the Brownsville charter significantly differs from the Corpus Christi charter as to item (2); Brownsville's charter does set maximum allowable compensation in the form of payment for service that will be compensated as follows:

Section 13. Compensation.
The mayor and city commissioners elected after the adoption of this amendment shall each receive as compensation for their services during their term of office the sum of ten dollars ($10.00) for their attendance for the full duration of each regular and special meeting; provided, however, that in no event shall they be paid for more than two regular and three special meetings in any one calendar month.

Clearly, the intent and irrefutable statement of the writer of this clause is that there is a MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE COMPENSATION which was lacking in the Corpus Christi charter, which formed the basis of Judge Garza's interpretation, as excerpted:

Mindful of the following statements made by the Texas Attorney General’s Office addressing an issue similar to the one in the present case:
If the charter sets the maximum compensation for city council members, the City may not provide additional compensation to city council members absent an amendment to the charter. See generally TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 9.004 (Vernon 1999) (election to amend charter). If the charter does not set their maximum compensation, the City may provide the additional compensation without a charter amendment.

HOWEVER the Brownsville charter CLEARLY addresses limits to compensation with the words, " that in no event shall they be paid for more than "
Language that is notably absent in the Corpus Christi charter.

In any event, it is noteworthy that for over twenty years, the City has interpreted the City Charter to mean that City Council members and the Mayor were entitled to participate in the City’s health insurance plan on the same basis as the City’s full-time employees, which was within their broad discretion.

The "squatters rights argument" (i.e. long standing tradition) played a noted part in the decision, as is clearly stated above. Brownsville has no such long standing tradition, ergo any and all related argument on this basis is moot.

What is significant in the appellate decision that applies to a potential Brownsville appeal is that insurance is compensation. This applies to stipulation (3) as well and establishes that the benefits, such as insurance, are monetary compensation.

The City Charter does not provide any further clarification as to the meaning of “compensation.” The trial court, in its second conclusion of law, stated that the payment of health insurance premiums by the City constituted “compensation.”
“Compensation” has been defined as “[r]emuneration and other benefits received Although opinions from the Texas Attorney General’s Office 4 are persuasive, they are not controlling on the courts. See Commissioners Court of Titus County v. Agan, 940 S.W.2d 77, 82 (Tex. 1997) (citing Holmes v. Morales, 924 S.W.2d 920, 924 (Tex. 1996)). 5 Section 141.004 of the local government code states that the “governing body of a home-rule municipality may set the amount of compensation for each officer of the municipality.” TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE AN N. § 141.004 (Vernon 2008). “Home-rule municipality” officials have broad discretion in exercising their powers—including decisions pertaining to compensation—limited only by the Texas Constitution, general laws, or the City’s Charter. See In re Sanchez, 81 S.W.3d 794, 796 (Tex. 2002); see also Edwards v. Murphy, 256 S.W.2d 470, 473-74 (Tex. Civ. App.–Fort Worth 1953, writ dism’d) (citing TEX. CONST. art. XI, § 5). in return for services rendered; esp. salary or wages.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 227 (7th ed. 2000); see Op. Tex. Att’y Gen. No. GA-0130 (2003). In applying its plain and common meaning, it is clear that the City’s payment of health insurance premiums on behalf of City Council members and the Mayor constituted “compensation” because the premiums were paid in return for services rendered by the City Council members and the Mayor. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at 227. This conclusion is in harmony with several opinions issued by the Texas Attorney General’s Office.4 See Op. Tex. Att’y Gen. No. GA-0130 (2003) (concluding that “‘[c]ompensation’ includes benefits, such as insurance, provided to officers and employees”); see also Op. Tex. Att’y Gen. No. GA-0449 (2006) (same). We therefore conclude that the trial court correctly categorized the payment of health insurance premiums as “compensation” in its second conclusion of law.

As to the possibility that this appellate court decision directly applies to a Brownsville appeal:

Moreover, we presume home-rule city charter provisions to be valid, and the courts cannot interfere unless it is unreasonable and arbitrary, amounting to a clear abuse of municipal discretion. Id. (citing City of Brookside Village v. Comeau, 633 S.W.2d 790, 792 (Tex. 1982); City of Houston v. Todd, 41 S.W.3d 289, 295 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. denied)). Because the City is a “homerule municipality,” we must focus our analysis on the City’s Charter.

This leads directly to the assertion that in any appeal of the insurance ruling (Docket #2007-03-1359-D 103rd District Court) that the Brownsville City Charter must be examined in situ and any reference to the Corpus Christi charter is again, moot.

Conclusion:

Should Mark Socci in his newfound capacity as City Attorney even sniff at an appeal of Judge Leal's proper finding of denial of insurance benefits to the Mayor and City Commissioners, he will find his legal rump paddled by a pro se friend of the court brief. I will laugh, he will be gone, and they will all still get voted out, if not recalled sooner.

"Of course I know. It is my business to know." -The Merovingian